Eight Pounds Lighter

August 16, 2011

From the transcript of Ron Paul’s interview with Piers Morgan last night:

On abortion, I just recognition [sic] as a physician and scientist that life does exist prior to birth. There is a legal right to it and there is a biological definition of it. And most people don’t think about it, that if you say the woman has a right to do what she wants with her body and what is in her body, that means that an eight-pound baby a month before birth can be destroyed and the doctor be paid for it.*

There is something awfully bizarre about a society that says oh, that’s OK because it’s a woman’s body. And every argument for all abortion endorses the principle that you can take that life and abort it and kill it. And I had to witness this. It’s very, very disturbing.

So I think that somebody has to speak for the meek and the small. And they do have legal rights. If you’re in a car accident and a woman’s pregnant and her baby dies, you’re — this is homicide. You’ve committed a very serious crime. You killed a life.

So, this whole thing that is simple to woman’s right to do what she wants with her own body — no, you have to deal with the fact. You have to decide is there a real life there? And there is a real life there.

I’m liable as a physician. If a woman comes in and if she’s a week pregnant or 10 months, pregnant, or was eight, nine months pregnant — if I do something wrong, rightfully, so I can be liable for injuring the fetus. So, if I give her the wrong medication, I’m liable for this.

To pretend that life doesn’t exist, that’s like putting blinders on.

And I don’t talk a whole lot about it. But I’ve made the emphasis the other day that if you truly care about liberty, you have to understand life because how can I defend a woman’s or any individual’s right to lead their own life as they choose and even do dumb things and drink raw milk or whatever they want to do, at the same time say that life is not precious?

And we can throw away a life even if it weighs eight pounds because it’s within the woman’s body.

I believe in property rights. I believe that a baby in a crib deserves protection, even though I honor property. And a house is our castle.

But nobody, nobody would say oh, a woman after the baby’s born, we can kill it. And today, we have this — all these abortions. But if a young girl is in a desperate situation and she happens to deliver her baby and kills it, she is arrested immediately. But if she had done it a day before, there was no crime and the doctor gets paid money.

That — even if you divorce this all from the law and enforcement of law, but morality. Our society has to decide whether that’s morally right or wrong in dealing with this.

I have high respect for life. Therefore I have high respect for liberty. And it’s hard to separate the two.

I’m going to defer to Paul’s experience “as a physician and scientist that life does exist prior to birth” and then I’m going to explain why that doesn’t matter at all when it comes to whether or not women have the right to abort a pregnancy on demand and without apology. In fact, I’ll even raise the stakes and say that we know for a fact that the baby (yes, ‘baby’, since we’re accepting Paul’s premise for now) will grow up to cure cancer and bring about total world peace.

[TRIGGER WARNING for descriptions of hypothetical rape.]

And we can throw away a life even if it weighs eight pounds because it’s within the woman’s body.

Now, let’s imagine that, instead of an eight-pound baby, a one hundred ninety pound man is within the woman’s body. In particular, his penis is in her vagina.

At this point, I haven’t said who this man is. I’d like to offer two possibilities:

  1. The man is her lover and they are engaged in enthusiastically consensual intercourse, or
  2. The man is a raping her.
Let’s start with the latter. Would Paul likely respond as follows:

On self-defense and stopping a rape, I just recognize as a physician and scientist that life does exist after birth. There is a legal right to it and there is a biological definition of it. And most people don’t think about it, that if you say the woman has a right to do what she wants with her body and what is in her body, that means that a one hundred ninety pound man in the prime of his life can be destroyed and the police be paid for it.

There is something awfully bizarre about a society that says oh, that’s OK because it’s a woman’s body. And every argument for all self-defense endorses the principle that you can take that life and abort it and kill it. And I had to witness this. It’s very, very disturbing.

I imagine it would be disturbing to kill someone or to have them killed in front of you, even if they were violating your body. Most of us aren’t rapists or murderers. In our legal order, “somebody has to speak” even for rapists and “they do have legal rights,” but it wouldn’t mean that it was wrong or even a moral dilemma to kill ‘em dead right then and there. Why? Roderick Long explains:

What gives a woman the right to kill as rapist in self-defense, then, is…that he uses her body in the most deeply intimate and personal way, without her consent (even if she originally consented, then changed her mind). And it is precisely this same fact that gives [her] the right to kill her unwanted fetus…Hence abortion is not a disproportionate response to the seriousness of the boundary-violation it counteracts. My argument for abortion rights may be expressed, then, by the following syllogism:

(a) One has the right to kill in self-defense if the threat is sufficiently serious.

(b) The threat posed by an unwanted fetus is sufficiently serious.

(c) Therefore, one has the right to kill an unwanted fetus in self-defense.

If Paul is half the libertarian he claims to be, I can’t imagine he would disagree with the right to self-defense against rapists, and for the same reasons. But I also imagine that he would object to the move over to abortion by bringing up the idea of “innocence” since what is more innocent that a little baby, right? Long again:

My analogy between fetuses and rapists will strike many opponents of abortion rights as absurd. Doesn’t this analogy ignore a vitally important difference – namely, that the fetus is innocent? The fetus did not choose to violate its mother’s boundaries; the violation occurred as a result of natural processes over which the fetus, in the nature of the case, could have no control (since these are the same natural processes that produced it).

Yes, this is of course an important difference; but it is not important in the relevant way. An unwanted fetus is an innocent threat, but is a threat nonetheless. A boundary-violation does not cease to be a boundary-violation just because the boundary-violator was acting involuntarily; nor does such involuntariness transform a profoundly personal intrusion into a minor inconvenience. Proposition 20 [“Every person has the right not to have her boundaries violated, and also not to have her boundaries invaded unless such invasion is necessary to end some wrongful boundary-invasion of hers, and such invasion is also not disproportionate to the seriousness of her boundary-invasion”] therefore licenses the killing of innocent threats in self-defense. To be sure, considerations of the threat’s innocence or guilt may legitimately affect judgments of the moral proportionality of the response. But when the threat is as personal and intrusive as an unwanted pregnancy, it is difficult to see how the innocence of the fetus could make enough of a difference to justify forcing the mother to quietly endure nine months of what is tantamount to rape. Analogously , even if someone has been involuntarily hypnotized into becoming a literal rapist, his victim still has the right to kill him in self-defense.

So, Ron?
So, this whole thing that is simple to woman’s right to do what she wants with her own body — no, you have to deal with the fact. You have to decide is there a real life there? And there is a real life there.
We’ve done that, I think. We’ve decided that if there is a life there, it doesn’t matter. “Every person has the right not to have her boundaries violated, and also not to have her boundaries invaded unless such invasion is necessary to end some wrongful boundary-invasion of hers, and such invasion is also not disproportionate to the seriousness of her boundary-invasion.” I could pretty much leave it there. Case closed. But Paul’s not done making confused arguments:
I’m liable as a physician. If a woman comes in and if she’s a week pregnant or 10 months, pregnant, or was eight, nine months pregnant — if I do something wrong, rightfully, so I can be liable for injuring the fetus. So, if I give her the wrong medication, I’m liable for this.
Also:
But nobody, nobody would say oh, a woman after the baby’s born, we can kill it. And today, we have this — all these abortions. But if a young girl is in a desperate situation and she happens to deliver her baby and kills it, she is arrested immediately. But if she had done it a day before, there was no crime and the doctor gets paid money.

Remember our first possible man above? The lover? If the police came in and shot him, they’d be liable, right? That’s because he is crossing her boundaries, but he isn’t violating them. The police are violating the male lover’s boundaries, however, because the police action “is not necessary to end any boundary-invasion” on the lover’s part. Surely, Paul gets this. Yet when it comes to abortion, he just can’t seem to figure out why we would be liable in one set of circumstances (no boundary violation) and not another (boundary violation), or why a woman can’t kill a baby that is no longer violating her boundaries. Here is a politician who supposedly founds his entire platform on the idea that we have a right to do what we want unless we are violating another’s rights, yet he can’t tell the difference between killing someone who is violating rights and someone who isn’t.

Here’s the key, Ron: we know the difference by checking for consent or the necessity to end another invasion, and when we don’t find either, we have a rights violation. Since I don’t see how a pregnancy can possibly count as necessary to end an invasion of the baby on the mother’s part, that leaves consent AKA choice, a woman’s choice. Not qualified consent. Just consent, on demand and without apology.

There is one apology needed, however. Paul should apologize to all women everywhere for his desire to deny them the same libertarian rights he would fight for in any other situation. You might be glad to get that off of your conscience, Ron. You might feel eight pounds lighter.

* I’m not going to focus on this but just stop with this tired, underhanded, misogynist example already.

19 Responses to “Eight Pounds Lighter”

  1. Julia Says:

    As someone with a uterus, I have to roll my eyes every time I hear men talking about abortion (expressing support for anti-abortion measures, that is). I mean, RP will never have to face an unwanted pregnancy because he has a dick.

    I feel that the only way abortion can ever be truly ended (or at least significantly reduced) is by creating a mutual aid-based society where *every* child is wanted. As it is right now, if a woman gets pregnant unexpectedly, that pregnancy is a burden on her. When her child is born, that child will also be a burden on her. As it is, there is so much demanded from the family unit to be their children’s *sole* providers, meaning some parents (especially single parents from disadvantaged backgrounds) feel ashamed and angry if they alone can’t provide everything their children need to grow up healthy and happy. As a society, we need to step up and start coming together so our communities become one big family. That works so much better than trying to ban abortion through legislation.

  2. James Babb Says:

    The boundary argument fails when an invitation is extended to cross it. Consensual, unprotected sex is a woman’s choice to invite a new life into her womb.

  3. Neverfox Says:

    That doesn’t much help Paul with abortions of involuntary pregnancies, in any case. As for voluntary pregnancies, I take it you didn’t read Roderick’s essay since he goes on at length about this particular objection. Here is the the relevant passage:

    Yet if the case of Miriam and Joshua is to justify (2), we must add that Miriam became pregnant voluntarily.36 And if Miriam’s pregnancy is voluntary, then Joshua’s boundary-crossing is not a boundary-violation, and so the argument for Miriam’s right to abort Joshua cannot get off the ground.

    We must, however, distinguish between pregnancies that were initially voluntary and pregnancies that are currently voluntary. Suppose that Miriam’s pregnancy began in as voluntary a fashion as one could ask for: she voluntarily engaged in intercourse with the deliberate intention of conceiving a child.37 But now she has changed her mind, and no longer wishes to carry Joshua to term. Her pregnancy was initially voluntary, but now it is involuntary. The same is true of sexual intercourse: a woman who begins intercourse voluntarily but then changes her mind has the right to back out halfway through; if her partner fail to respect this wish, he is guilty of rape, even if he (and she) have been socialized not to think of it that way.38 Consent, to justify, must be sustained.39 [186] When Miriam’s pregnancy was voluntary, Joshua’s occupation of her body was a mere boundary-crossing; but now that Miriam has changed her mind, that occupation has become a boundary-invasion.

    Yet what distinguishes Miriam’s case from the case of Stan the airline pilot, or from the case of the initially willing mother who later abandons her baby? Cannot Stan say that he started the flight as a willing pilot, but has since changed his mind, and thus that forcing him to continue piloting would be involuntary servitude? (And likewise for the abandonment case?) It seems that (2) and (3) have come into potential conflict once more. Either we grant Miriam the right to change her mind, in which case it is unclear how we can deny the same right to Stan or to the abandoning mother; or we deny Stan and the abandoning mother the right to change their minds, in which case it is unclear how we can grant that right to Miriam. What could justify giving different answers in the two cases?

    Recall that in denying Stan the right to abandon his passengers, and in denying an initially willing mother the right to abandon her child, we appealed to principle (21), which established that such abandonments are killings rather than mere lettings-die. That is, we showed that abandonment in such cases is a boundary-crossing – and therefore, since the victims did not consent, a boundary-invasion. But that was only part of the story. In order to show that Stan’s passengers and the newborn infant have the right not to be abandoned, it was necessary, according to (20), to show that the boundary-invasion would be a wrongful one. This we were able to do by showing that no such boundary-invasion was necessary to counteract any wrongful boundary-invasion on the part of the passengers or of the infant; a boundary-invasion that lacks such an excuse is a boundary-violation, and (20) prohibits all boundary-violations. But in Miriam’s case, killing Joshua is necessary in order to counteract his wrongful invasion of her body,40 and so Miram’s act of aborting Joshua is not a boundary-violation. That is the crucial difference between abortion and abandonment.

    Also, I think pregnancy is different from rape in a way that makes your argument even less forceful. You essentially cast the situation as an invitation. This implies that there is a person in circumstance A that is invited to circumstance state B. That is a mistake. There is no person (assuming fetal personhood for the sake of argument) until the person is conceived within the womb. In other words, I think this overlooks the issue of original conditions and the existence of prior rights. As Roderick points out:

    It is true, of course, that a woman who deliberately hypnotized a man into attempting rape, and then killed him in self-defense, would be blameworthy for his death; but that is presumably because she violated his rights in the first place by voluntarily placing him in a situation where she would be justified in killing him. There is no analogous rights-violation in the pregnancy case; we surely do not violate a person’s rights merely by bringing him or her into existence. (emphasis mine)

    And Rad Geek:

    Whatever duties you may have to rescue those in distress, they derive first, from the condition that they were in before the emergency, and second, from the condition of distress that the emergency puts them in relative to that original condition. But there is no original condition in the case of a pregnancy — there was nothing at all before the conception (emphasis mine)

    So no, the argument doesn’t fail. Abortion on demand and without apology.

  4. NYPA Says:

    Long is certainly right when he explains that “a boundary-violation does not cease to be a boundary-violation just because the boundary-violator was acting involuntarily,” but this fact is succorless with respect to his argument.

    The fetus is neither a complicit violator of boundary nor a happenstance violator of boundary. How could it be? Long is conflating a boundary-violation as a product of volition–of deliberate and willful action, irrespective of whether its consequences were intended–with a boundary-violation whose violator has no determinate will to speak of.

    A fetus has neither produced the situation in which it finds itself, nor made any contribution toward doing so. It is, in every sense, a victim of circumstance. Put in its place by another–or by two, as the case may be.

  5. Neverfox Says:

    But I don’t see any good reason to claim that our right of self-defense depends on whether the violator (or whatever term you wish, if you find that to be question-begging) “produced the situation in which it finds itself, nor made any contribution toward doing so.” How is your objection not answered by Long’s “hypnotized rapist” thought experiment? I mean, you say “with respect to his argument,” but his argument includes the part where he addresses this, explicitly:

    My analogy between fetuses and rapists will strike many opponents of abortion rights as absurd. Doesn’t this analogy ignore a vitally important difference – namely, that the fetus is innocent? The fetus did not choose to violate its mother’s boundaries; the violation occurred as a result of natural processes over which the fetus, in the nature of the case, could have no control (since these are the same natural processes that produced it).

    Yes, this is of course an important difference; but it is not important in the relevant way. An unwanted fetus is an innocent threat, but is a threat nonetheless. A boundary-violation does not cease to be a boundary-violation just because the boundary-violator was acting involuntarily; nor does such involuntariness transform a profoundly personal intrusion into a minor inconvenience. Proposition (20) therefore licenses the killing of innocent threats in self-defense. To be sure, considerations of the threat’s innocence or guilt may legitimately affect judgments of the moral proportionality of the response. But when the threat is as personal and intrusive as an unwanted pregnancy, it is difficult to see how the innocence of the fetus could make enough of a difference to justify forcing the mother to quietly endure nine months of what is tantamount to rape. Analogously , even if someone has been involuntarily hypnotized into becoming a literal rapist, his victim still has the right to kill him in self-defense.

    Objection: Not if she’s the one who deliberately hypnotized him. Reply: Yes, even then, I think. A woman never has an obligation – or at any rate, never has an enforceable obligation – to let herself be raped. That’s moral bedrock if anything is. The notion of an enforceable obligation to let one’s body be used by a rapist is a moral obscenity; and the same holds for the notion of an enforceable obligation to let one’s body be used as an incubator by a fetus, even if the mother is responsible for the fetus’s presence there in the first place. The right to abortion, like the right not to be raped, is inalienable; one cannot legitimately enslave oneself by waiving in advance one’s right to control one’s own body. This follows from (20); since boundary-violations are prohibited, the only way Miriam could alienate her right to her body is by placing her body outside her own boundary, so that someone could use her body as a mere means without using her as a mere means. But unless Miriam has acquired the knack of astral projection, this is impossible.

    Responsibility is irrelevant here.

  6. Madfoot Says:

    Do you have to call pro-lifers misogynists? Jesus Christ, I’m pro-choice, but people like you are idiots.

  7. Neverfox Says:

    If you go back and read what I wrote, you will see that I said, “this tired, underhanded, misogynist example.” I did not “call pro-lifers misogynists.”

    With that said, I think that the pro-life position as we know it today exists primarily because of, supports, and expresses institutional misogyny, and because of this, those kind of examples are symptomatic of a system that dehumanizes women through language and framing. It’s not a claim about intentions (though that can be true in any given case), but about culture.

  8. NYPA Says:

    Ah… I’d forgotten about that comment I’d left. I’m back. Sorry for the delay.

    I reject the proposition that responsibility is primarily legally irrelevant as ethically objectionable. Moreover, I stipulate that any “right” one might have to neutralize an innocent but prima facie threatening body would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

    I do believe that you are a mutualist. Doubtless you reject the forcible eviction of peaceful and decorous squatters by absentee claimants of land.

    Imagine that a wanderer decides to take camp in your front yard for, say, nine months. He is, to you, only trivially injurious, but, because of the nature of knowledge of the conduct and relative stability of others, it is impossible to say that he should not be threatening at some point in the duration of his stay.

    Would killing him on the grounds that he poses a threat in some meaningful sense be acceptable?

  9. NYPA Says:

    Also, it’s interesting that you reject the proposition that you’d called pro-lifers “misogynists” and then in the same breath go on to say that you imagine that the pro-life position is somehow structurally misogynistic. How clarifying of you.

  10. Neverfox Says:

    I do believe that you are a mutualist. Doubtless you reject the forcible eviction of peaceful and decorous squatters by absentee claimants of land.

    Imagine that a wanderer decides to take camp in your front yard for, say, nine months. He is, to you, only trivially injurious, but, because of the nature of knowledge of the conduct and relative stability of others, it is impossible to say that he should not be threatening at some point in the duration of his stay.

    Would killing him on the grounds that he poses a threat in some meaningful sense be acceptable?

    Absentee? How exactly is a woman’s body absentee? I’m not sure I could come up with a more dehumanizing analogy if I tried. And what about “uses her body in the most deeply intimate and personal way, without her consent” is so hard to understand?

    Also, it’s interesting that you reject the proposition that you’d called pro-lifers “misogynists” and then in the same breath go on to say that you imagine that the pro-life position is somehow structurally misogynistic. How clarifying of you.

    Because I took the original complaint to be that I was claiming a conscious & direct misogyny, something I didn’t do because it’s something I can’t generalize. If Madfoot simply meant that I’m an idiot for thinking that “the pro-life position as we know it today exists primarily because of, supports, and expresses institutional misogyny,” then I disagree.

  11. NYPA Says:

    I did not mean to use an analogy suggesting that a woman’s ownership of her person was in any way removed or absentee. I proffered an example of the sort of thing I imagined you’d take issue with (“Doubtless…”) and then I proceeded to outline the analogy of the camping wanderer (“Imagine that…”).

    I am sorry that you found it excessively “dehumanizing.” I do not at all mean to make hay of the enormously emotional happening that an unexpected pregnancy must be. But I think that my analogy stands and would appreciate your thoughts thereupon.

    Also, the “original complaint” you speak of was that of Madfoot, not myself. I, for one, don’t think that you’re an idiot for thinking that the pro-life position is misogynistic. I just think you’re wrong.

  12. Neverfox Says:

    Sorry for the mix-up. I edited the comment to reflect the correct attribution.

    As for you analogy to my front yard, it seems to driving at the question of proportionality (since most people would probably think that killing in this case was disproportionate force). As Rad Geek puts it, however:

    Well, O.K., but then the issue is no longer the moral legitimacy of aborting the pregnancy. It’s the moral legitimacy of using one particular abortion procedure rather than a different abortion procedure.

    As far as real-world cases go, in the tiny minority of abortions which are performed late enough that the fetus might in principle be viable, procedures that result in the killing of the fetus, such as intact D&X, are almost always chosen over, say, simply inducing labor, specifically in order to make the abortion safer for the pregnant woman. (D&E/D&X are preferred over labor induction, hysterotomy and hysterectomy procedures, where they are possible, specifically because they have documented lower morbidity and mortality rates. Reason why is that, as it happens, trying to shove an intact human head out through your cervix and vagina is an extremely painful and medically risky thing to do. I do not think that proportionality demands taking on significant additional pain and risk of illness or death in order to evict an unwanted user of your internal organs, any more than it demands not evicting them.)

    Moving from real world cases to imaginary cases, sure, if you invent a magical means of teleporting viable fetuses out of the uterus without having to pass them through the cervix and vagina, and without having to cut them out, and the magical teleport procedure has no complications that would make it in any other way riskier than D&E/D&X, then I’d be willing to accept that if a fetus is a rights-bearing person (a premise I’m not convinced of, but also have not ruled out of court as of yet), then you might have a moral obligation to use that particular procedure to abort the pregnancy rather than to use D&E or D&X. But, again, that would not be an exception to the call for abortion on demand and without apology; it would only be an argument for choosing one method of abortion on demand as opposed to a different, less practically rational method.

    The person in my yard can be removed without killing him a thousand different ways. That would seem to weaken the analogy unless you’re trying to make some other point that I’m not seeing.

  13. Robert Says:

    In response to your argument of “changing your mind” in regards to a pregnancy: say you were to invite a man into your house. However, halfway through serving him tea and biscuits, you decide you expressly do not want him there. You politely ask him to leave, however, to your dismay you find he’s deaf, dumb, and blind and you’ve no way to communicate your desires to him. So, in order to end the inconvenience of his presence, you shoot him in the face. By your logic, this would be entirely justified.

  14. Neverfox Says:

    If by “your logic” you mean a logic that nowhere appears in my post or Roderick’s essay, then sure, I supposed my logic justifies that. But if instead you mean what I actually said, then my logic comes to the opposite conclusion. The principle of proportion that prevents me from justifiably shooting him in the face is referenced four times in the post, four more times in the comments preceding yours, and 28 times in the Roderick Long essay that I linked to. While I should probably be insulted that you would assume that after all my thinking on this subject I would have set up such a ridiculous consequence of logic, your reading comprehension (or more likely, your refusal to actually read anything I or Roderick wrote) reassures me that you are either dishonest, an idiot, or both.

    Seriously, can anyone…anyone?…Bueller?…come with a novel argument that isn’t already addressed explicitly by Roderick, Charles, or myself?


  15. “The boundary argument fails when an invitation is extended to cross it. Consensual, unprotected sex is a woman’s choice to invite a new life into her womb.”

    Translation: That slut bitch cunt CHOSE to have sex like a dirty, filthy whore! And she caved in to the persistent guy who said that he can’t do it with a condom! Therefore, she DESERVES to be raped every second of the day for nine months, that fucking slut bitch cunt!

  16. Joel Fry Says:

    Dr. Long,

    All humans have souls. Love is a pleasure that remains a wish. As the longing for love is satisfied, the wish for love increases. This facility is not present in dogs. This is the facility of the soul. It is present in every fetus, no matter how small or underdeveloped. If you don’t believe humans have souls, you don’t believe that philosophers remember all they learn rather than acquiring new knowledge. In fact, you would have no basis for life at all, as Kierkegaard notes in Fear and Trembling. There is an absolute right only in that it comes from God. If I tell someone not to do something immoral, I am not coercing him, I’m warning him. There’s a difference.

  17. Neverfox Says:

    Joel,

    This is not Dr. Long’s blog.

    All humans have souls…It is present in every fetus, no matter how small or underdeveloped.

    Maybe, maybe not. I fail to see how that’s decisive. If humans have souls, then rapists have souls too. Does that take away a woman’s right to defend herself from a rapist?

    If I tell someone not to do something immoral, I am not coercing him, I’m warning him. There’s a difference.

    OK, but who said otherwise?

  18. Joel Fry Says:

    The fact that rapists have souls is a red herring (as it is tangenital to my argument). It’s like saying, “Because a rapist has a soul, what he does is right.” Every woman, regardless of her station in life or her intelligence level has an equal right to defend herself. To say a fetus has no rights because it has no intelligence is like saying a retarded person has less of a right to defend herself because her lack of intelligence makes her less human. Quiz: Do you believe all MEN are created equal or that all BABIES are created equal?

    My statement that there is a punishment for sin is not coercion but warning. I’d like to know what you think though.

  19. kuro Says:

    Joel

    When you say “[t]o say a fetus has no rights because it has no intelligence”, I automatically assume you didn’t read *anything* Neverfox or Roderick Long actually wrote.


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