They Only Come Out at Night

December 21, 2008

Late the other night, not long after publishing my first real post, I received a comment from the subject of my post, Stephan Kinsella, who continues his recent trend of support for the principles underlying labor self-management. Oddly, perhaps in an attempt at humor, he decided to disguise this support in a polemic tone. So in the spirit of things, I’ll play along. It’s always nice to engage with a fellow native son of Baton Rouge. And I don’t mind a little droll humor. You might even see me use some around here occasionally.

I’m not sure if it was the early hour or what, but he appeared to have not read my post very carefully since many of his responses were swinging at ghosts and a large majority of his “objections” actually serve to buttress my point.

One of the strangest ghosts was this idea he had that I was arguing against the co-responsibility of anyone involved as an “idea” person.

I’ve argued–I think very clearly–for why I think someone who hires another person to commit a crime is guilty as a co-conspirator, in Causation and Aggression. It does not rely on these bizarre notions of who owns the means or has “de jure” control, etc.

That’s exactly right. All responsible people are “co-conspirators”. No one responsible party can alienate their responsibility to another, even if they consent to do so. It doesn’t depend on who owns the means or has de jure control. I’m glad that Kinsella seems to have understood my post well enough to summarize the major points so succinctly.

By the way, I recommend that everyone read his article linked above. It is an excellent source of supporting principles for understanding how the productive activity of labor in creating the output “renders all of its participants independently and jointly responsible”. But if we move from criminal examples to non-criminal ones, Kinsella seems to forget his own conclusions (or rather he plays dumb).

I am really mystified at what you are getting at. What do cakes have to do with murder?

Yet he offers no reason why the criminal nature of a resulting action matters when determining who is responsible for the action. Can non-criminal results not have intentional causation? Yes, there is no third-party “victim” but there is the question of who appropriates the newly produced outputs. Since Kinsella finds me incoherent (a charge,  on certain days, I’m inclined to agree with), I’m going to call on Theodore Burczak at length to explain the problem:

The controversial issue to notice at this juncture is the rather curious position rented workers assume in this analysis. It would seem that in order for the entrepreneur to be the regarded as the solely responsible agent of a joint productive venture, workers must play a similar role in the firm as do guns in a robbery: they are the instruments of the entrepreneur’s will.

For Ellerman,…the relevant question is to determine who is responsible for production in the capitalist firm. Once the responsible agent of production is identified, Ellerman proposes that we can call upon the “juridical principle of imputation” in order to establish the just appropriator of the entire product. This widely-accepted principle maintains that people should be held legally accountable, or responsible, for the consequences of the actions for which they are factually responsible…In Ellerman’s view, the agent responsible for production is not [the] indivisible entrepreneur alone, but all the workers—mental, manual, and entrepreneurial—who labor in the firm together.

The typical employment contract in a capitalist enterprise is consequently illegitimate. This contrasts with Locke who believes that it is just for a person to sell his labor time to, say, an entrepreneur, giving the entrepreneur the legal right to appropriate the entire product resulting from the laborer’s efforts. Ellerman points out that when worker B sells his labor time to entrepreneur A thereby granting A control rights over B’s labor time and allowing A to appropriate the entire product of B’s labor, the worker is no longer legally responsible for the results of his productive activities. The entrepreneur becomes the last owner, and hence appropriator, of his employee’s labor time. As such, the worker assumes the legal status of an inanimate object while employed by the entrepreneur.

One purpose of law courts is to determine factual responsibility for criminal behavior in order to assign legal responsibility. When jurists do this, they are applying the juridical principle of imputation. When legal responsibility does not line up with factual responsibility, most people believe that an injustice exists that needs to be rectified. In the realm of production and resource allocation, Ellerman considers one of the roles of economists to be the identification of the factually responsible agents of production, in order to determine how the juridical principle of imputation should be instituted in an economic context. It is impossible to alienate responsibility for one’s actions, whether one is a bank robber or an employee, and if the juridical principle of imputation is to apply in production, all workers should participate in the appropriation of the entire product of the firm. In particular, workers should be the last owner of their labor time. Ellerman concludes that because it is factually impossible to alienate responsibility for one’s actions, it is unjust for a worker to be transformed by a legally recognized labor rental contract into the means (a thing without legal responsibility) to an entrepreneur’s ends.

The comparison between a bank robber and an employee may illustrate why Ellerman believes that workers’ consent to give up legal responsibility for the entire product of their labor efforts in exchange for a wage is unjust. If a rich murderer uses a considerable cash payment to entice a willing poor person to bear the legal responsibility for the murder, a court would not recognize this contract by jailing the pauper for the crime, even if he agreed to the exchange. Such a contract violates the juridical principle of imputation. Likewise, an entrepreneur’s appropriation of the entire product and his receipt of profit from a productive firm employing wage-labor are based on what Ellerman regards as a fraudulent wage-for-labor-time exchange. For an economist who accepts all the implications of the juridical principle of imputation, the only way in which joint production can be justly organized is if it occurs in a labor-owned [sic. Berczak incorrectly uses “owned”. You can’t own the role of the firm.], self-managed firm in which all manual, mental, and entrepreneurial workers participate jointly in the appropriation of the entire product.¹

This is not saying that consenting adults can’t agree to whatever valid agreement they wish. Kinsella seems concerned that I’m arguing otherwise.

But they can agree among each other to whatever they want, so long as they are not violating others’ rights. In the case of the cake, if I understand it, they’ve agreed so certain titel  [sic] transfers as between themselves. These agreements are legal since they do not aggress against outsiders. Dude. You are way off base here.

Here Kinsella could mean one of two titles:

  1. The title to their labor power
  2. The title to their labor product

But we already know that Kinsella doesn’t mean the first.

Under libertarianism, an individual has the sole right to control his body as well  as scarce  resources originally appropriated  by the individual or by his ancestor in title. Since ownership means the right to control, an individual may be said to own his body and homesteaded resources he has acquired. He is a “self-owner” as well as an owner of acquired resources. In the case of acquired resources, the rights of ownership include the right to transfer title to others because one can abandon, by manifested intent, a previously unowned resource that was acquired by manifested intent. In other words, rights in acquired resources may be alienated at will because of the way in which they come to be owned.

By contrast, although one may be said to own—to rightfully control—one’s body,  the same reasoning regarding  acquisition, abandonment, and alienability does not apply. The act of acquisition presupposes that there is an individual doing the acquiring, and an unowned thing acquired by possessing it. But how can someone “acquire” his body? One’s body is part of one’s very identity. The body is not some unowned resource that is acquired by the intentional embordering action of some external, already existing acquirer.

Because the body is not some unowned resource that an already existing individual chooses to acquire, it makes little sense to say that it can be abandoned by its owner. And since alienation of property derives from the power to abandon it, the body is inalienable. A manifestation of intent to “sell” the body is without effect because a person cannot, merely by an act of will, abandon his or her body. Title to one’s body is inalienable, and it is not subject to transfer by contract.²

Also clear from this passage is that in order to transfer something alienable, such as the output of a productive activity, you have to acquire it first.

Despite my perfect agreement with Kinsella on this point, he still comes to  the strange conclusion that the shareholders were the first to appropriate the whole product.

Because they don’t own the capital? Because that’s not the deal? Jesus, this is not that hard.

Labor is clearly the first possessor being responsible for producing it (and having not alienated their responsibility). So if it “was the deal” that the shareholder should obtain the product, then it  must come by conditional transfer, not by direct appropriation. Therefore, shareholders cannot  claim to be the RC and become essentially bond holders and quitclaim transferees. And it’s very “Marxoid” to think that ownership, and not licit responsible possession, makes one the claimant on an output and liable for used-up inputs (returning to Capital the borrowed items in the condition they were loaned and with time-preference).

Might we then just think of each employee as an independent contractor selling the product?

One possibility is to think of employees as independent contractors, so that we interpret what workers sell to the entrepreneur to be the product of their efforts, and not control over their labor activities.

While this interpretation may have analytical purchase for some readers, a typical employee in a capitalist enterprise working on, say, an assembly line would surely not be astonished if he were fired for stepping off the line to talk to his stock broker on a cell phone. He would not be surprised because he knows that he has not sold the product of his efforts to the directing entrepreneur. He has rented his time to that entrepreneur, who thus enjoys the right, within limits, to command the employee as she pleases during the contracted period. The actual servitude resulting from a labor-rental contract and the appropriation of an employee’s labor time by the hiring entrepreneur do not disappear by analytically construing an employee to be a self-managed firm of one.¹

So I’ll ask Kinsella again (and it was never in “Marxoid English” unless terms like residual claimant are Marxist), how does a shareholder obtain the role of residual claimant when they are neither the owner of the labor power, the  responsible party for creating a liability for used-up inputs, nor the first possessor of the unowned product? That would be some magic trick.

¹ Burczak, Theodore, “A Critique of Kirzner’s Finders-Keepers Defense of Profit”, The Review of Austrian Economics, 15:1, 75–90, 2002.

² Kinsella, Stephan, “A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability”, Journal of Libertarian Studies, Volume 17, No. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 11–37

9 Responses to “They Only Come Out at Night”

  1. Stephan Kinsella Says:

    Neverfox, or whoever you are–

    “By the way, I recommend that everyone read his article linked above. It is an excellent source of supporting principles for understanding how the productive activity of labor in creating the output “renders all of its participants independently and jointly responsible”. But if we move from criminal examples to non-criminal ones, Kinsella seems to forget his own conclusions (or rather he plays dumb).”

    No. I’ve elaborated on the problem of “Libertarian Creationism” (see also Objectivist Law Prof Mossoff on Copyright; or, the Misuse of Labor, Value, and Creation Metaphors; and my papers A Theory of Contracts: Binding Promises, Title Transfer, and Inalienability and Against Intellectual Property, pp. 36-, section “Creation vs. Scarcity”)–the idea that property rights or homesteading come from creation or labor. It does not. It comes from appropriating previously unowned resources (homesteading), or acquiring such a good from a previous owner by voluntary transfer of title (gift or contractual transfer). Keep this in mind in your various comments about labor and management and “ownership” of the “output” of labor, etc.

    “Yet he offers no reason why the criminal nature of a resulting action matters when determining who is responsible for the action.”

    Because, there is only responsibility in the first place, when there is a crime. If there is no crime, there is no “responsibility.” Get it?

    “Can non-criminal results not have intentional causation?”

    Yes. I can persuade my brother-in-law to be rude to his mother. In this case, both I and my brother in law are doing something immoral. But neither he nor I violates her rights, so there is no libertarian responsibility at issue.

    “Yes, there is no third-party “victim” but there is the question of who appropriates the newly produced outputs.”

    There are no newly produced outputs. See the above-linked posts. There is only transformation of already-owned goods into new configurations–hopefully more valuable catallactically. But these factors were already owned–by the capitalist, say. He hires labor to perform actions, for a price–wages. He need not agree to transfer title to the raw materials he owns. He’s only hiring them to perform some services, and he pays them whatever they agree to. This is exceedingly non-difficult to comprehend. The rest of your post and the long quotation seems to be a confused way of saying that even though the businessman (factor-owner) made an agreement to pay laborers a specified wage in exchange for their performing certain actions, this agreement is invalid for some Marxoid reason and they are *really* entitled to the new property. If I agree to pay my maid $10 to polish my silver, then voila, she now owns (at least a part of) the “polished silver” since after all she mixed her labor with it. What nonsense.

    People do not own “labor”–labor is just an action. People do not own the value of their property (see the post above re Mossof); nor to their reputations or ideas.

    “The comparison between a bank robber and an employee may illustrate why Ellerman believes that workers’ consent to give up legal responsibility for the entire product of their labor efforts in exchange for a wage is unjust. If a rich murderer uses a considerable cash payment to entice a willing poor person to bear the legal responsibility for the murder, a court would not recognize this contract by jailing the pauper for the crime, even if he agreed to the exchange.”

    Actually, they *would* “recognize” the contract–it would be a critical factor in holding the rich guy vicariously liable for the actions of the poor contractor. But there is no analogy here to workers agreeing to “give up legal responsibility for the entire product of their labor efforts in exchange for a wage”. This is just nonsense-talk. It is not an argument at all. It is just an assertion, mired in ridiculous, unscientific, Marxoid conceptions of “labor”.

    “Likewise, an entrepreneur’s appropriation of the entire product and his receipt of profit from a productive firm employing wage-labor are based on what Ellerman regards as a fraudulent wage-for-labor-time exchange.”

    It’s not “fraudulent” at all. If the entrepreneur does own the factors, he does no violate a laborer’s rights by offering to pay him a stipulated payment if he performs certain actions (that might make the property more valuable).

    “This is not saying that consenting adults can’t agree to whatever valid agreement they wish. Kinsella seems concerned that I’m arguing otherwise.”

    You are, actually. You want to re-write the agreement labor and entrepreneur strike, under the pretense of these tossed off, vague, loosey-goosey notions of “fraud” and analogies to criminal conspiraces or in reliance on mystical and pseudo-scientific Marxoid notions of labor.

    “Also clear from this passage is that in order to transfer something alienable, such as the output of a productive activity, you have to acquire it first.

    Despite my perfect agreement with Kinsella on this point, he still comes to the strange conclusion that the shareholders were the first to appropriate the whole product.”

    I don’t need to put it this way b/c I do not suffer from the delusion that the firm is creating “new”, previously-unowned things. Labor is relevant only to homesteading *unowned* things, and then only b/c it is one way of embordering–appropriating–the thing. Firms hire workers to work on already-owned things. The goal is to transform their configuration into a more useful or desirable shape or function that can be sold for a sufficiently high price. By the owner. The worker is not the owner. The guy who owns it is. If I own a fallen tree and offer you three of my chickens if you will make a canoe out of it, then I own the canoe since it’s my tree–and you own my three chickens. You have no claim on my canoe. The question of ownership of labor never arises. I just assume you have practical control over your body and actions, and that you can make a canoe for me out of my tree, if you want–so I make you an offer, which is essentially a unilateral, conditional title transfer: “Three of my chickens become yours IF you carve my tree into a canoe-shape.”

    “Might we then just think of each employee as an independent contractor selling the product?

    ” One possibility is to think of employees as independent contractors, so that we interpret what workers sell to the entrepreneur to be the product of their efforts, and not control over their labor activities.”

    You can think of it how you like, but these Marxoid metaphors are obviously leading you into error, so I’d advise against it.

    “how does a shareholder obtain the role of residual claimant when they are neither the owner of the labor power, the responsible party for creating a liability for used-up inputs, nor the first possessor of the unowned product? That would be some magic trick.”

    I don’t use these loaded terms to understand the situation. The shareholder has some ownership claims over the assets of the corporation, obviously. They have them by contract with other shareholders, the directors, and management. The initial resources (say, cash) are used to purchase various factors (say, raw materials). These are acquired from previous homesteaders (or their descendants in title). Employees are hired and the deal is: IF you do XYZ actions (transforming or re-arranging the raw materials owned by the corporation), THEN we will pay you $X. This is very simple. No mystery. No opening for the laborers to have a claim on the property of their employer.

  2. Neverfox Says:

    Stephan,

    I’ll check out the links you posted before I reply. And, by the way, thank you for dropping in and participating so actively on my completely new and unknown blog. Your insight is welcome and appreciated.

  3. Nick Says:

    Neverfox,

    I agree with your overall idea but I’m not sure if I agree with how you get there. In theory, I see nothing wrong with the idea of two people A and B creating a contract in which B does service X with A’s tools and gets paid Y, but doesn’t own the tools. It’s just that this situation has no relation to the current economic structure of society. The relationship of labor to ownership will have to do with the social norms of a society, as will the ability to enforce contracts. In the liberated society we are fighting for, it’s not going to be easy to find people willing to spend their lives lining your pockets, so even if somebody is somehow in a position to employ others on “their” machines, nobody will come. I think the property claims of today’s large-scale employers are null and void because of the historical and political reality of why they’re here, rather than because the workers automatically assume responsibility for what they create – although they should indeed begin to do that.

  4. Neverfox Says:

    Labor uses capital. So what does that mean? Let’s look at your “A Libertarian Theory of Contract”:

    First, note that the owner, who has the sole right to control the resource, can permit others to use it. For example, he can lend his ox to his neighbor. This highlights the distinction between ownership and possession. The owner has rights to a thing even if he does not possess it. Note also that “permitting” others to use one’s property is done by manifesting (communicating) one’s consent to the borrower. The manifested consent of the owner of a good to permit its use by others is what distinguishes a licit act (such as a loan) from an illicit act (such as theft); it is what distinguishes invited guests from trespassers. In short, because the owner of property has the right to control it, he can, through a sufficiently objective manifestation or communication of his consent, permit others to possess the thing while he maintains ownership.

    So here a loan is granting use but not ownership. But later you say,

    In a loan contract, the creditor conveys title to money (the principal) to the debtor in exchange for a present agreement to a future transfer of money (principal plus interest) from the debtor to the creditor. For example, Jim borrows $1000 now from Bank to be repaid in a year with $100 interest. Analyzed in terms of title transfers, Bank transfers title to $1000 of its money to Jim in the present, in exchange for (conditioned on) Jim contemporaneously agreeing to a title transfer to future property; and Jim’s future title transfer is executed in exchange for the contemporaneous $1000 title transfer.

    Oops! Now it appears that you see loans as full blown transfers of the loaned property. Not even I was claiming that! But hey, if you want to go there, I’m game. It would be game over for you though.

    So which is correct? I’ll let you tell me.

    But in the meantime, consider if you let me borrow your car and I stripped it down to parts, would you simply ask for the parts back? Would you say, “No problem, guy. I still have the matter that composed it. It’s only a transformation of already-owned goods into a new configuration–a less valuable one catallactically to be sure but these factors were already owned so don’t worry about it. By the way, I feel bad that you didn’t get anything for your effort. Can I give you a few bucks?” You gave me the licit use of it and didn’t say I couldn’t strip it down.

    Because, there is only responsibility in the first place, when there is a crime. If there is no crime, there is no “responsibility.” Get it?

    That is absolute nonsense. Crime is not a necessary condition of responsibility. You are making up definitions. Responsibility is simply the answer to the question “Who did it?” Whether the question has legal bearing or not is a separate matter. If you only look at negative outcomes or rights violations then you could never determine if a person fulfilled (was responsible for) a contract condition. Imagine you say, “I’ll give $X to the first person who does Y.” If you deny the full meaning of responsibility, you could never determine who to pay.

    I hold the Juridical Principle of Imputation: People should have the legal responsibility for the positive and negative results of their intentional actions.

    And in production, only labor (which always includes thinkers and managers) is responsible. The other factors are things and cannot be responsible. Early Austrian economists Friedrich Freiherr von Wieser explains:

    If it is the moral imputation that is in question, then certainly no one but the labourer could be named. Land and capital have no merit that they bring forth fruit; they are dead tools in the hand of man; and the man is responsible for the use he makes of them.

    But then Wieser plainly admits that he has to work around this conclusion to justify capitalism by creating something called “economic responsibility”, which became the basis of marginal productivity theory:

    In the division of the return from production, we have to deal similarly … with an imputation,—save that it is from the economic, not the judicial point of view.

    This is a plain admission of animism; an unfounded exception that things can be responsible in production contexts (but nowhere else it seems). Now that is mystical.

    Yes. I can persuade my brother-in-law to be rude to his mother. In this case, both I and my brother in law are doing something immoral. But neither he nor I violates [sic] her rights, so there is no libertarian responsibility at issue.

    There is no legal responsibility because rudeness isn’t a legal issue in a libertarian world the way property rights are. Why don’t you use relevant examples?

    If I agree to pay my maid $10 to polish my silver, then voila, she now owns (at least a part of) the “polished silver” since after all she mixed her labor with it. What nonsense.

    That’s the oldest straw man in the book. And if you bothered to understand my argument, you would know that this is addressed and in fact it’s exactly the kind of contract that isn’t a problem.

    Is a something new produced here? I don’t see it. This is not a technically-described production activity. And even if you did see it that way, you would be forgetting the liability created for the unpolished silver (and I’d argue a contemporaneous agreement to payoff that liability with the matter contained therein). Or course we could also simply use your loan-with-contemporaneous-agreement setup and make the whole thing moot.

    Actually, they *would* “recognize” the contract–it would be a critical factor in holding the rich guy vicariously liable for the actions of the poor contractor.

    First of all you misinterpreted the example (one of several examples that you don’t bother to read what you argue against. You just start flinging out words like “Marxoid” which is endlessly ironic). The rich man did the murdering and contracted with the poor man to “bear the legal responsibility”, i.e. “I’ll transfer title to $X to you on the condition that you bear legal responsibility”.

    And second, if we do interpret it the mistaken way (that the poor man does the murdering and the rich man agrees to take the legal responsibility), then your “recognizing” would be simply as basis for proof of involvement. The quote talks about “recognizing” the contract itself, i.e. defending it as valid. So you just proved my point by saying that he would be liable.

    It’s not “fraudulent” at all. If the entrepreneur does own the factors, he does no [sic] violate a laborer’s rights by offering to pay him a stipulated payment if he performs certain actions (that might make the property more valuable).

    Here is your definition of fraud:

    [F]or the libertarian, fraud is a type of aggression (namely, theft), just because it is a means by which one party receives or uses or takes the property of someone else without their consent–and there is failure of consent because the first party’s misrepresentation meant that one of the conditions to transfer of title was not satisfied.

    The employer, by taking the RC role, implicitly claims to have received the laborer’s responsibility (a misrepresentation) and thus the new product. But then you say,

    I don’t need to put it this way b/c I do not suffer from the delusion that the firm is creating “new”, previously-unowned things.

    No one thinks this way. When you have a technically-defined production process, there is obviously something new created. For the same reason that you know exactly when something has been destroyed, you know when it has been created. When I stripped down your car, I doubt you’d be claiming that you own a “car” anymore. This view of production as “just moving some stuff around” is silly in the extreme.

    If I own a fallen tree and offer you three of my chickens if you will make a canoe out of it, then I own the canoe since it’s my tree–and you own my three chickens. You have no claim on my canoe. The question of ownership of labor never arises. I just assume you have practical control over your body and actions, and that you can make a canoe for me out of my tree, if you want–so I make you an offer, which is essentially a unilateral, conditional title transfer: “Three of my chickens become yours IF you carve my tree into a canoe-shape.”

    Let’s say the tree is Bob’s and you borrow it in addition to hiring me. Does Bob now own the canoe?

    You can think of it how you like, but these Marxoid metaphors are obviously leading you into error, so I’d advise against it.

    This is further proof that you don’t read what you respond to. I was saying that it wouldn’t be valid to think of it this way.

    I don’t use these loaded terms to understand the situation.

    It seems that “everything” is a “loaded” “term” to “you” which is “why” you put “scare” quotes on “every” word” to “avoid” actually “addressing” a “statement” you understand “perfectly” “well”.

    The shareholder has some ownership claims over the assets of the corporation, obviously. They have them by contract with other shareholders, the directors, and management. The initial resources (say, cash) are used to purchase various factors (say, raw materials). These are acquired from previous homesteaders (or their descendants in title).

    OK, so capital owners own capital. That’s brilliant insight. I’m in awe of your observation skills. But you haven’t justified your acceptance of the myth that the residual claimant’s role is part of the property rights of the capital owner’s role. Your Marxoid worldview is simply not accurate as can be observed all the time in the real world.

    Employees are hired and the deal is: IF you do XYZ actions (transforming or re-arranging the raw materials owned by the corporation), THEN we will pay you $X. This is very simple. No mystery. No opening for the laborers to have a claim on the property of their employer.

    That’s a fine agreement too. If you want to give money to someone on condition, knock yourself out. But it doesn’t address who appropriates the whole product, both the positive and the negative (liabilities). There is no debate if the actions are services that don’t produce any liabilities for capital services used and aren’t technically-described production processes.

    Also, by making it crystal clear that the transfer is conditional on the completion of the action, then you are saying that the employee is not actually “hiring” labor. By hiring, I mean that they aren’t bearing the costs of labor. They are only, as you say, transferring title to money on a condition. If they didn’t actually bear the costs of labor, they have at the very least not accounted for both costs needed to be the residual claimant alone.


  5. Kinsella is in the wrong, plain and simple, and he has NO counter-argument! I used to think he was a great thinker, but now I see he’s just full of hot air. It makes me mad to see it clearly displayed now.


  6. Neverfox, thank you for starting your blog. Thank you for this entry, which should be a must-read. I will link to your blog at once.

  7. Neverfox Says:

    Franc,

    Thanks for the kind words and support. You encouraged me to start a blog when I wasn’t really thinking about it.

    As for Kinsella, I still think he is a valuable libertarian thinker in many ways even if we do disagree on major points. I enjoy reading his work, which is often clear and detailed, even if I end up compelled to disagree. I find his recent comments around the conflation debate to be simply baffling though. As someone once said to me, “He has the same problem as Block; he’s not very good at interpreting his opponent’s views. Good guy, though.” I don’t know him well enough to comment on that last part but I’m willing to give him the benefit of the doubt.


  8. You should write new entries. So far your blog is doing very well, but you might lose people’s interest if you don’t write some more.


  9. [...] From Instead of a Blog, “They Only Come Out at Night”, 21 December [...]


Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

%d bloggers like this: